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POST-MODERNISM, ALLEGORY, AND 
HERMENEUTICS IN BRAZIL
Bruce Krajewski, award winner
Postmodernism tends to substitute enactment for interpretation—a rhetorical 
approach for the acknowledgement of history—tends to project a two-dimensional 
world in which line is freed from contour; narrative movement is lateral rather than 
progressive; figures, even objects are not depicted. . . . Postmodernism describes a 
sensibility a feeling for innovation, for experiment with conventional ways of 
framing experience so that it is at once removed from recognizable relationships 
and from the locations in which they exist. This movement is variously informed by 
a skeptical attitude toward illusion, toward a recognizable psychology of human 
relationships, and toward coherence of any sequence of actions.
—Stanley Trachtenberg, 
The Postmodern Moment
Where everything is bad it must be good to know the worst.
- F .  H. Bradley
The almost insoluble task is to let neither the power of others, nor our own 
powerlessness stupefy us.
—Theodor Adorno, 
Minima Moralia
THIS E s s a y  Is a version of a response to a question that Brazil poses: 
What does it mean to try to understand that which insists on being 
un-understandable, or aporetic, where aporetic means not that no 
passages of understanding can be found, but that one is faced with a 
hundred roads diverging in a tangled wood—an invitation to 
dispersion?
For the hermeneuticist, aporia are invitations to possible insight. 
While some see aporetic texts as sources of confusion and bewilder­
ment, a hermeneuticist like Gadamer views confusion and bewilder­
ment as nascent stages on the way to understanding and self- 
understanding. Conundrums and puzzles lead us to think. Gadamer 
writes, “It is invariably true that when we see something we must think 
of something in order to see anything.”1 A text’s or a person’s or a 
situation’s resistance to interpretation provokes, but Gadamer does
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not take this provocation as a belligerent act, rather as a condition of 
life, a life in which “we proceed constantly through the coexistence of 
past and future,” through the familiar and the strange. “The essence 
of spirit lies in the ability to move within the horizon of an open future 
and an unrepeatable past.”2
A meeting with something or someone aporetic calls us to do 
something. Of course, some critics will say an interpretation of the 
different constitutes a form of co-option or assimilation that wipes out 
difference. However, Gadamer’s discussion of our experience with 
strangeness—particularly with a rt—insists on “allowing what is to 
be.”3 We must allow the work of art, the strangeness (whatever form 
it might take), to speak to us, and “we must realize that every work of 
art only begins to speak when we have already learned to decipher and 
read it.”4 Strangeness and otherness take on meaning in relation to 
our ability to take it upon ourselves to produce a shared community of 
meaning.
My task here with Brazil involves producing possible meanings, 
though not just any possible meanings, but ones that will develop into 
a certain position and that will have at least some empirical ground­
ing. In this essay on Brazil, I want to concentrate on possible readings 
of the film, on meanings for the film, using as much material evidence 
as possible, while leaving aside the cancelling-out function that de 
Man mentions. I am appropriating Brazil to make it speak to the 
present debates about postmodernism, and I do not feign neutrality in 
these debates.
I
To call Brazil postmodern is to open myself to attack by those who 
demand the rigor of definition, because what is to be called “post­
modern” is still under debate. Postmodernism has yet to petrify, even 
though many are ready to label it regressive (Habermas, Jameson), 
and just as many are prepared to call it “progressive” (Rapaport, 
Ulmer). The practices of postmodernism are diverse (and perhaps 
diversionary). Postmodernism refers to a multiplicity of cultural 
practices chracterized by such things as collage, hybridization, distor­
tion of scale, pastiche, and unreadability. More generally, postmo­
dernism might be called the New Rococo. Etymologically, rococo is a 
French Enlightenment word that means the fanciful alteration of 
rocaille shellwork. As its critics stress, this etymology presents a major 
problem in postmodernism, that is, that postmodernism functions as 
a shell without any substance, that the postmodern is but a play of 
surfaces, like a Hollywood set composed entirely of facades, or like the 
hydrodynamics of a soap bubble. Critics might call it ornamentation
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without foundation, without purpose. The postmodern shell covers a 
void.5
Although Post-Modernism is used in a non-architectural context as 
early as 1938 by Arnold Toynbee, postmodernism comes into its own 
through architecture, and the postmodern movement in architecture 
becomes associated with architects like Gae Aulenti, Robert Venturi, 
Charles Jencks, and Paolo Portoghesi. The beginnings of Post- 
Modernism in architecture are quite different from the postmodern­
ism Habermas or Jameson talk about. For instance, Venturi’s Complex­
ity and Contradiction in Architecture (1966) suggests not ahistoricism, but 
historical awareness, not incoherence, but intricacy and ambiguity. 
Venturi reacts against Modernism and its “clean,” “straightforward,” 
“articulated,” “pure” structures. Venturi says, “I am for messy vitality 
over obvious unity. I include the non sequitur and proclaim the 
duality.”6 Still, these non sequiturs and dualities are not meant to 
banish readability or truth. “A valid architecture,” he says, “evokes 
many levels of meaning and combinations of focus: its space and its 
elements become readable and workable in several ways at once.”7 In 
this way, Venturi sounds much like Paul Ricoeur, who in Interpretation 
Theory says that metaphors and complexities within a sentence do not 
undo meaning, but offer a reader a surplus of meaning. In Architecture 
Today, Charles Jencks echoes the notion of surplus meaning:
A Post-Modern building is double coded—part Modern and part something else: 
vernacular, revivalist, local, commercial, metaphorical, or contextual. In several 
important instances it is also double coded in the sense that it seeks to speak on two 
levels at once: to a concerned minority of architects, an elite who recognize the 
subtle distinctions of a fast-changing language, and to the inhabitants, users, or 
passersby, who want only to understand and enjoy it.8
The use of language in Jencks’s description suggests what could be 
called a rhetorical architecture, for it is concerned with context and 
audience, with delighting or persuading that audience, much in the 
manner of a sophist trying to win over a crowd. This is the sort of 
architecture that commands the attention of those capable of being 
initiated into what is hidden, or double-coded, those who want to see 
more. The complexity of the architecture teaches the inhabitants that 
there is something more to be understood.
The rhetorical side of early postmodern architecture, and the 
writings that accompany that architecture, emerges most clearly in the 
work of Paolo Portoghesi, who, in what Jencks calls “his most creative 
book, The Rome of Borromini: Architecture as a Language (1967), showed 
that Borromini used a highly rhetorical set of figures and complex 
language because he was strongly motivated to communicate specific 
religious and structural ideas to a wide audience and to sustain interest 
in, and continual reinterpretation of, these ideas.”9 Portoghesi’s own
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work and writings reflect his interest in Borromini, in the value of 
communication and continual interpretation, which shows an aware­
ness of Gadamer’s point in Truth and Method that we are always 
understanding differently. The pleroma, the fullness of time, will 
bring out the plethora of meaning.
Unlike some postmodernists, Portoghesi does not wish to put 
history and tradition under erasure. In fact, the theme of the 1980 
Venice Biennale (Portoghesi was the organizer of the architecture 
section of the Biennale), where postmodern architecture came into 
public prominence, was “The Presence of the Past.” John Blatteau 
elaborated on the theme in his architectural self-portrait for the 
exhibition: “It is again possible to learn from tradition and to connect 
one’s work with the fine and beautiful works of the past.”10 Clearly, 
these architects listen to what has come down from the past, and the 
hope is to make the past present again.
When postmodernism leaves architecture and enters the discourse 
of literary criticism and philosophy, it takes a nasty negative turn and 
becomes a conglomerative carnival of cacophony, assimilating ex­
tremely heterogeneous modes of stylisitic expression, but often this 
expression aims not to press out, or make its way out to others; 
instead, postmodernist expression in its non-architectural context 
seeks to excommunicate, to cut people off from a common base of 
understanding. Not to understand becomes one of the goals of 
postmodernism, or, at least, postmodernists like to frustrate or “prob- 
lematize” understanding. Derrida’s method of using paronomasia or 
repetition in his works serves as an example of this postmodernist 
strategy to move away from any grounding—in other words, to float.
The image of floating, or flying, appears not only in Brazil, but also 
in Herman Rapaport’s discussion of Lauri Anderson’s United States, 
specifically a piece called “Blue Pacific.” The speaker, Blue Pacific, “is 
a surface, an atmosphere of modulating moods. . . . She is a tourist 
whose state is an undercommitedness of consciousness. . . . She 
appears to sleep even while awake. ‘Blue Pacific’ isn’t a name at all but 
just the topos associated with a flotation of voicings.”11 For postmo­
dernists, this state of floating, or undercommitedness, signifies free­
dom, an escape from hegemony. For Rapaport, Anderson’s perfor­
mance in United States “is releasing or activating resonances which 
undermine . . . hegemony’s efficacy as a stable equilibrium in which 
the power of the elite culture appears natural.”12 In “Blue Pacific,” 
“character itself is never quite established, since the performer has 
successfully ‘submerged’ herself in a neutrality of doing.”13 The 
images of flotation and submersion appear to contradict, but actually 
complement each other in the context of neutrality, for both images
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indicate a movement away from any ground. Those who float or who 
are submerged do not take up any position in the sense of a stand. 
The acceptance of neutrality in Rapaport’s version of postmodernism 
turns against rhetoric, against peitho. To be persuaded of something— 
the design the rhetorician has on an audience—is to take a position 
(perhaps even a dance position, and human dance requires a ground; 
one submits to the hegemony of gravity).
From another perspective, postmodernism’s attraction to the per­
formative could be seen as a pre-rhetorical, or proto-rhetorical, 
moment, as one of the few ways expression can make its way in the 
world in the face of a crushing hegemony. According to one account 
of the “origin” of rhetoric, Sicily in 467-466 B.C. was ruled by two 
tyrants, Gelon and Hieron.
It is said that the tyrants indulged their savagery to the extent of forbidding the 
Syracusans to utter any sound at all but to signify what was appropriate by means 
of their feet, hands, and eyes whenever one of them was in need. It was in this way, 
they say, that dance-pantomine [orchestike] had its beginnings. Because the Syracu­
sans had been cut off from speech, they contrived to explain their business with 
gestures [or dance-figures: schemansi].14 [Farenga is quoting from Prolegomenon 
sylloge, ed. Hugo Rabe (Leipzig: Teubner, 1931)].
As part of the commentary on this passage, Vincent Farenga says, 
“Rhetoric is not, then, innate to human society, but it nonetheless 
comes to the citizens as something they need to regain their self­
presence, their identity or true nature.”15
Dance, which one might also see as a form of play, links up with 
identity, presence, and ground. It is play in the way Gadamer speaks 
of it, in the way he appeals to the original meaning of play {Spiel) as 
dance. “The movement which is play,” Gadamer says, “has no goal 
which brings it to an end; rather it renews itself in constant 
repetition.”16 This conception of play and repetition differs greatly 
from that of postmodernists like Derrida, who employs repetition to 
reveal the negativity in play. Gadamer too notes that subjectivity 
dissolves in play, for it is play playing, but the play leads to the player’s 
reconciliation with self: “That which detaches [the player] from 
everything also gives him back the whole of his being.” 7
From the side of postmodernism, play empties being. Despite 
feeling trapped and tyrannized, postmodernists still dance. On to the 
stage comes the dancing Derrida, who wishes to expunge presence, 
identity, and truth through a certain kind of play—frivolity. “Philo­
sophical style congenitally leads to frivolity,” he writes. “If philosoph­
ical writing is frivolous, that is because the philosopher cannot fulfill 
his statements. He knows nothing, he has nothing to say, and he 
complicates, subtilizes, refines the stylistic effects to mask his igno­
rance [masks will become important in the discussion of Brazil]. Thus
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he misleads, pays change out of the essential emptiness of his 
discourse.”18 Hans Blumenberg understands the relationship between 
this negativity and frivolity, and his perspective unsettles Derrida’s 
playfulness:
One who discovers the law of increasing misery sees everything driving toward the 
point at which the only thing left is for everything to become different [differance].
Frivolity is only a weak derivative of all this, a means of anthropomorphic 
relaxation of tension vis-a-vis myth: One can do this, or say that, without being 
struck by lightning. It is the first stage of ‘Enlightenment’ satire, of rhetorical 
secularization as a stylistic technique employed by a spirit that is not yet confident 
of its [or his] enlightened status.19
Derrida claims that frivolity begins its work in repetition, “in the 
fissure which, separating two repetitions, rends repetition in two. The 
repetition of the idea, the identity of ideas is not frivolous. Identity in 
words is frivolous.”20 The repetition of words characterizes Derrida’s 
writing, for he wishes to show how supplementarity is at work. 
Repeating a word places it in a new context, giving it a different sense. 
The infinity of contexts in which words appear eliminates the possi­
bility of words having uni vocal meanings, or what might be called an 
identity. This is what Derrida calls iterability. Part of Derrida’s project 
involves exacerbating this iterability to produce undecidability. He 
empties language by overfilling it with frivolity, by decorating the 
margins to make a kind of illuminated manuscript that gives off no 
light, only lightness. However, this frivolity is not to be taken 
frivolously. Derrida does willful violence with deconstruction, for he 
uses repetition in its etymological sense, i.e. to attack again. Then 
again, one might see, as Richard Bernstein has begun to, that even 
deconstruction is done in the name of something.21
It becomes clear that Gadamer’s notion of play and Derrida’s idea of 
play, or frivolity, are different. One of the points that distinguishes 
Gadamer’s talk of play and postmodern play is that Gadamer’s play 
looks like children’s play. In Truth and Method, for instance, Gadamer 
talks about the children’s game of “Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Sailor,” 
and the way children play motor-cars.22 On the other hand, postmod­
ern play is sophisticated adult play that often isn’t play at all, but 
overly self-conscious self-consciousness, which continually denies it­
self. It plays off a self-lesser-than-thou attitude. And this is why I 
choose to stay with the side of rhetoric rather than postmodernism, 
because rhetoric signals a return to trust, wobbly as that trust might 
be. Rhetoric makes its full appearance in the “original” story of 
rhetoric with the entrance of Korax, who, after the Syracusans 
overthrow the tyrants, steps forward when everyone is talking and 
persuades the crowd to be silent. Korax transforms democratic noise 
into silence again, but this silence comes about through peitho rather
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than bia, consent rather than compulsion. Gerald Bruns sums up this 
account of rhetoric’s beginnings by saying, “The whole lesson of 
rhetoric, it turns out, is not how to speak, but how to render others 
speechless. . . . Rhetoric is the recuperation of tyranny by means of 
language.”23 Rhetoric too has its dark side, which must be acknowl­
edged and understood.
II
One of postmodernism’s facets that requires attention, in relation to 
Brazil, is the turn toward allegory. Long disparaged, allegory re- 
emerges as an important part of postmodernism, without its Christian 
cross to bear, without much weight at all in the case of Brazil. In a 
two-part article, Craig Owens speaks of an “allegorical impulse” in 
postmodernism.24 Why this impulse? In “Notes on the Reemergence 
of Allegory,” Stephen Melville says we live in “an age whose relation 
to its past has become problematic. . . . [This age] will be led to find 
and guarantee itself and its work through detour and delay—works 
and devices of indirection.”25 Allegory is indirect discourse, a speaking 
otherwise. As Gadamer says, “Allegory originally belonged to the 
sphere of talk, of the logos, and is therefore a rhetorical or herme­
neutical figure. Instead of what is actually meant, something else, 
more tangible, is said, but in such a way as to suggest the other.”26 In 
other words, allegory points to a condition in which what needs to be 
said cannot be said directly for some reason. Allegory, as Bruns 
figures it, protects us. The truth cannot be viewed directly, so allegory, 
or “the veil of words,” mediates the truth. Without the curtain or the 
veil, we would be unable to see anything at all because the light would 
blind us. Bruns writes:
No doubt it is the job of understanding to penetrate [sic] the veil of words and to 
disclose what is hidden, but in fact the understanding cannot accomplish the task 
quite in this way. He who understands something is usually less knowledgeable 
than resourceful. He is able to regard what is hidden by constructing a version of 
it or by construing a meaning of what is not evident—but throughout all of his 
artfulness the veil remains intact.27
The reader does not pass over the surface of the allegory, for the 
surface gives what is to be understood. It is not surprising then that 
the surfaces of allegories are detailed, ornamented, specific in a very 
odd way since the extreme specificity provides clues to general 
insights, to larger cultural associations. In its simplistic form, allegory 
toys with generality, as in the case of the medieval play Everyman in 
which the characters’ names reveal their roles in the drama. In the 
modern and postmodern periods, allegories tend to be less like 
Everyman and more like Kafka’s stories, say “In the Penal Colony.” 
Although this modernist text assigns characters general names like the
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Officer and the Explorer (making it similar to the Everyman allegory), 
Kafka includes a far more intricate allegorical surface in, for example, 
his complex description of the machine used to punish. In the tale, the 
Officer tries to aid the Explorer in understanding the machine by 
showing him the plans for the device. “The Explorer would have liked 
to say something appreciative, but all he could see was a labyrinth of 
lines crossing and re-crossing each other, which covered the paper so 
thickly that it was difficult to discern the blank spaces between 
them.”28 Despite the opacity of the text before him, the Explorer 
realizes that there is something to be understood, but as an outsider, 
as one who is uninitiated, he is not prepared to understand. For the 
moment then, he is unable to read what is going on, so he is stopped 
at the surface.
The question I want to ask about Brazil is related to the Explorer’s 
dilemma: What happens to understanding when all is surface? What 
happens when a veil conceals nothing?
Like Kafka’s allegories, Brazil presents a detailed, elaborate surface. 
At the beginning of the film, the time and the approximate historical 
period appear on the screen. It is 8:49 p.m.; the action takes place 
“Somewhere in the 20th Century.” These two items reveal themselves 
to be pseudo-details, allegorical touches without allegorical import. 
The time constitutes a needlessly precise detail; on the other hand, the 
tag “Somewhere in the 20th Century” constitutes an overly general­
ized piece of information, like the Everyman title. The film quickly 
moves to contradict this generality, however, for the film shows the 
viewer a chronologically specific world of cars, computers, televisions, 
microwave ovens—a world quite familiar to the middle class of 
advanced industrial society. The effect is something like the Russian 
formalist notion of ostrananie, the device of making something strange 
in order that the viewer or reader might see the familiar as if for the 
first time. For instance, the computers in the film look like the 
personal computers now in use, except the keyboards have the kind of 
keys one would find on an old manual typewriter, and the monitor, 
instead of being a box like a television set, is more like a thick piece of 
glass. The disguising, or the allegorizing here, is of the slimmest sort, 
so that the boundaries between reality and allegory often dissolve. In 
other words, reality does not seem to buttress the disguise, as if there 
were no face to support the mask.
“Allegory,” says Craig Owens, “is consistently attracted to the 
fragmentary, the imperfect, the incomplete—an affinity which finds 
its most comprehensive expression in the ruin. . . .”29 Brazil's ruin is 
Sam Lowry. He is fragmented, imperfect, and incomplete—Postmod­
ern Man. “Ruin” is from the Latin verb “to fall,” and this is what
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happens to Sam from the outset: His course is steadily downward. 
One can even find the word “low” in his name.
The first-time viewers see Sam, we do not see Sam, but rather his 
heroic vision of himself in a dream. Also, Sam’s absence is accented 
from the beginning of the film. At the Department of Records where 
Sam works, Mr. Kurtzmann (another of those allegory-like names), his 
boss, steps out onto a platform overlooking the workers, and Kurtz­
mann calls out, “Has anybody seen Sam Lowry?” No response. No 
one, not even the viewer, has seen Sam. Sam is not noticeable, as is 
made clear later in a brief chat Sam engages in with Jack Lint, a friend, 
as the two pass in the huge building that houses the Department of 
Records:
Jack: If I’m worried about anyone, Sam, it’s you. Sam, whatever happened to you?
(Jack touches Sam’s topcoat).
Jack talks about Sam in the past tense. It is as if Sam does not exist, or 
at least possesses no identity. (Part of his identity is tied into his 
clothing, another surface feature, an item which becomes important 
later in the film when Sam “rescues” Jill from the state police). Later 
in the same conversation, Jack comments on Sam’s job at the Depart­
ment of Records, telling him that it is impossible to get noticed in 
Sam’s present job. Sam’s response is “I know. Wonderful, marvelous, 
perfect.” The triadic adjective phrase is an echo of the words Jack has 
used moments earlier. Apparently, Sam is incapable of formulating 
his own phrases, but this does not bother him. He revels in it, 
prefering to be transparent. Sam wants to be an absence (like his 
father who is absent from the film), so that he can be unreadable. 
There is no text-ure to absence. Despite Jack’s encouragement, Sam 
refuses to re-present himself, relinquishing that responsibility to 
whom? An important question here is whether there can be any such 
thing as the understanding of that which withholds itself or remains 
hidden. Given what Sam says, he does not wish to understand or to be 
understood, an act which calls for the presence of others. Sam wishes 
to withhold his responsibility for things that go on in the world around 
him, as he demonstrates when he tries to defend himself against Mrs. 
Terrain, who proposes in an accusatory tone that Sam do something 
about the terrorist bombings that have been going on for 13 years. 
Sam’s response to Mrs. Terrain is that the bombings are not the 
responsibility of his department. From Sam’s point of view, he is 
relieved of his obligations to society by his lack of position. In a society 
so specialized, so fragmented, Sam’s realm of control, of responsibil­
ity, is quite small. He cannot even cope with basic malfunctions in his 
own apartment. More generally, Brazil shows us a society without a 
leader, someone to take responsibility for a large range of matters.
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Unlike 1984 , Brazil never shows us Big Brother, only brothers. We see 
Central Services, but no Center. Sam lives in an ennucleated society, 
which might explain why the terrorist bombings prove ineffective. 
There is no head to kill, and the appendages of the bureaucracy seem 
to regenerate.
The first time the viewer sees Sam, the viewer does not see Sam. We 
get caught up in the pool, or whirlpool, of Narcissus, because the 
viewer’s first vision of Sam is Sam’s vision of himself. The viewer sees 
Sam’s construction of himself in a dream in which Sam imagines 
himself to be an Icarus-like hero, a mighty, winged man flying above 
the clouds. To know the story of Icarus is to know that people who 
fancy themselves to be Icarus-like are in for a bad fall, or at least a 
return to Mother earth. In Sam’s case, the fall becomes a return to his 
mother and things associated with his mother, like the exotic. For 
example, his mother has a leopard rug in her home, and wears an 
upside down boot covered in leopard skin as a hat. (This hat 
symbolizes the inversion Sam’s mother desires. She wants to turn back 
time, to regain her youth through a face-lift). The exoticism of Ida 
Lowry can be tied to the film’s title as well, since the country Brazil 
reminds one of the Amazon and the jungle. As Sam returns to his 
mother’s abode at the end of the film—he goes there with Jill seeking 
refuge from the police, and he is about to have intercourse with Jill in 
his mother’s bed when the police storm into the room —he also returns 
to “Brazil,” the song, for comfort. In fact, the very words of the 1939 
song include the notion of return. In the film, return becomes 
synonymous with escape. Icarus too ascended to escape a labyrinth, a 
world that seemed to have no exit.30 For the moment, the stress of the 
Icarus image is on the letter “I,” hence the pronoun, i.e. on Sam’s 
narcissistic tendencies, and what becomes of his obsessional desire.
In Sam’s dream, a sound, a cry, alters the flight path of Sam/Icarus, 
the amalgam of Sam and the Icarus-like hero in his dream. The cry is 
a woman’s voice calling out “Sam!” Sam/Icarus’ direction changes with 
the recognition of his name. By attending to this call, Sam finds a 
veiled woman who is also hovering about, and Sam/Icarus flies over to 
her to kiss her through the veil. He kisses the imaginary mouth that 
utters his name.
Another call, this one from Mr. Kurtzmann reminding him that he 
is absent from work, interrupts Sam’s dream. Once again, he responds 
to a call for his presence, his attention.
When we return to Sam’s dream, a new figure enters, a large, 
Samurai-like creature, who, from Sam/Icarus’ perspective, has had 
something to do with the veiled woman being caged. A passage from 
Adorno’s Minima Moralia makes some sense of this great, enigmatic
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Samurai figure. Adorno writes, “Pieces of news, like the repulsive 
humoristic craze for the Loch Ness Monster and the King Kong film, 
are collective projections of the monstrous total State. People prepare 
themselves for its terror by familiarizing themselves with gigantic 
images.”31 As Sam/Icarus finds out when he removes the Samurai’s 
mask: The Samurai is Sam. In an essay, “The Festive Character of 
Theater,” Gadamer writes:
It is the unsettling gaze of the mask that is pure attention, all surface with nothing 
behind it, and thus pure expression. It is the rigidity of the puppet on a string that 
nevertheless dances, the alien shock that shakes our comfortable bourgeois 
self-confidence and puts at risk the reality in which we feel secure. Here we no 
longer come to self-knowledge within the sovereign realm of our inwardness. We 
recognize ourselves as the plaything of the mighty, supra-personal forces that 
condition our being.32
Sam is behind this image of the total state, for he is a functionary 
within it, complicit in a bureaucracy, and feeling guilty. Sam knows 
that a mistake has been made. Archibald Tuttle, heating engineer, was 
supposed to be taken into custody, but instead people from the 
Ministry of Information arrested a Mr. Buttle, who died under 
questioning. Sam goes to Buttle’s family in “Shangrila Towers” to try 
to give them a check to compensate for their loss, and out of this 
meeting comes the question, “W here’s the body?” Some accounting 
for the absence of Buttle’s body must be made (to establish Buttle’s 
identity), and the question disturbs Sam, even though Sam himself 
longs to be absent, to be a missing body, one who will not be noticed 
or questioned.
For Sam, his freedom comes from lack of ambition in his job. 
However, as far as Sam’s mother is concerned, his stagnation in his job 
is a sign of his immaturity. She tells him, “Sam, it’s time for you to 
grow up and accept responsibility. Your poor father would be 
appalled at your lack of promotion.” Growing up means moving 
vertically, and verticality is what characterizes the total political state in 
Brazil. The connection between verticality and power pervades the 
film. Pauline Kael, in her review of Brazil, notes that “the picture has 
a weirdly ingenious vertical quality: the camera always seems to be 
moving up and down, rarely across, and this seems like a violation of 
nature.”3 Most of the buildings in the film look like towers, and as I 
have noted, the Buttle family lives in a place called “Shangrila 
Towers.” Interestingly, Jill Layton, whom Sam thinks is a subversive, 
first appears in the film in a bathtub. Jill is in a horizontal position that 
conflicts with the dominant vertical. Her resistance to verticality is 
reflected in her derisive attitude toward anyone or anything con­
nected with the bureaucracy, e.g. she knocks aside a snoopy machine 
when she goes to the Department of Records to reclaim Mr. Buttle’s
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body.
Mrs. Lowry encourages Sam to move vertically by accepting a 
promotion Mrs. Lowry has arranged with Deputy Minister Help­
mann, who has fond memories of Sam’s father. Sam meets the Deputy 
Minister at a party Mrs. Lowry throws to celebrate her face lift 
(another concern with the vertical, i.e. lifting sagging things up). 
Helpmann calls on Sam for assistance in getting to the bathroom, 
since he is confined to a wheelchair. Sam lifts Helpmann, makes him 
vertical so that he might use the urinal. Helpmann’s inability to get his 
own body vertical testifies to his impotence. (His name, as in an 
allegory, tells us something about him: he needs help). During the 
time that Helpmann and Sam are in the bathroom, Helpmann begins 
to reminisce about Sam’s father, who is absent from the film, “a ghost 
in the machine,” indicating that his presence is still felt despite his 
absence. In his nostalgia, Helpmann spills some powder on the 
bathroom sink, and he spells out ERE I AM J H in the powder. ERE 
I AM J H is an anagram for Jeremiah, the name of Sam’s father. The 
anagram is also a code that operates the elevator that eventually takes 
Sam to the top of the Ministry of Information. The name Jeremiah 
can also be linked to the elevator, because Jeremiah is Hebrew for 
“God will elevate.”
Of course, Sam’s interest in scaling the vertical, in moving up, is 
prompted by his desire for Jill Layton, by his desire to keep her 
horizontal. He wants power over her, as he does in his dream. The 
desire in his dream and the desire in reality coincide for Sam. To 
paraphrase Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus—desire makes its 
entry when the question “What does it mean?” cannot be answered, or 
perhaps even asked. In other words, Sam’s inabilities to figure out his 
own situation, to make sense of the world, lead him to focus his 
attention on desire. It is important to note that Sam’s desire for Jill 
Layton emerges from a dream. He has an image of a woman in his 
dream, and this dream-woman appears on a television monitor.34 Jill 
then becomes an obsession for Sam, so that a man who was once 
indifferent to promotion, at times even hostile to it, now craves to 
move up, to become more involved in MOI, since he believes that a 
promotion will allow him to gain more information about her. What 
he craves, however, is information, not understanding, and this leads 
him to misunderstand the object of his dream. By the end of the film, 
Sam’s desire for Jill Layton leads him to erase her by taking her off the 
central computer. In a sense, she then exists only for him, as she does 
in his dream. She is present for him, but absent from society, or at 
least from the state’s method of accounting for people.
Here I want to introduce an on-the-other-hand, because a herme-
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neuticist recognizes that Being and Not-being are equally and inseparably 
fundamental. For instance, while Sam’s absence is important, he also 
seems at the same time to be omnipresent. Mr. Kurtzmann is looking 
for Sam at the beginning of the film; Sam’s mother worries about him, 
as does Jack Lint. He is someone who is on many people’s minds, or 
one might say, Sam is “in the air,” as he is literally in his dream. As Jill 
Layton discovers, Sam is not easily gotten rid of. Jill kicks him out of 
her cab, but Sam comically clings to the cab, popping up all over the 
outside of the cab as it speeds along, a scene very similar to one in 
Raiders of the Lost Ark. He is an annoyance that people cannot shake 
off. Even at the end of the film, Sam is nettlesome to his tortureres, 
because they “lose” him —Sam escapes into an imaginary world and 
hums the theme song of Brazil. Further torture becomes useless. 
Although Sam withdraws mentally, his body remains, and something 
must be done with it.
The viewer might read Sam as an embodiment of the film. Sam 
shows himself to be an empty shell. He might be omnipresent, in a 
sense, but his presence makes no difference. In a perverse statement, 
director Terry Gilliam claims that this “empty shell” of a character 
who hums the theme song is really a hero. Gilliam says Sam “escapes 
into madness, which I’ve always considered a reasonable approach to 
life in certain situations. To me, that’s an optimistic ending. Lowry’s 
imagination is still free and alive; they haven’t got that. They may 
have his body, but they don’t have his mind.”35 “Madness is reason” 
sounds like the slogan “War is Peace” in 1984. The political implica­
tions of such postmodernist “logic” need to be questioned, for it is 
certainly not optimistic that at the end of the film viewers are left to 
see that the state bureaucracy triumphs. The mass of people remain 
subject to a brutal total state, substantially unaffected by all forms of 
resistance—even terrorism.
Terrorism is a major theme in Brazil. At its most radical, Brazil 
seems to endorse terrorism. At its most pessimistic, Brazil tells its 
audience that even terrorism is useless against a bureaucratic state 
(read: United States). In the first five minutes of the film, a bomb 
explodes in a store displaying eight television sets. One of the TV sets 
survives the explosion. Terrorism depends on television’s survival. 
The remaining TV set is tuned to an interview program in which 
Deputy Minister Helpmann is being questioned about terrorism. 
Although the bombing campaign is in its 13th year, the Deputy 
Minister is not taking terrorism seriously. The interviewer asks, “What 
do you believe is behind this recent increase in terrorist bombing?” 
Mr. Helpmann replies, “Bad sportsmanship.” Obviously, the state 
does not feel threatened by the bombings.
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The relationship between Sam and Jill Layton is connected to 
terrorism as well. Part of Sam’s attraction to Jill Layton seems to be his 
assumption that she is part of a terrorist group. (Again, Sam’s 
attraction to the exotic). Jill, as Sam’s ideal of beauty, is a terrorist. 
Vicki Hearne is one writer who recognizes the relationship between 
terror and beauty. Hearne writes, “To know beauty is to know the loss 
of beauty and thus full angst in the face of the knowledge of death.”36
Sam transfers his own desires for terrorism onto Jill, as the viewer 
sees when Sam reaches across and pushes on the accelerator in Jill’s 
truck when Jill and Sam are approaching a police roadblock. After 
crashing through the roadblock, Sam is jubilant. Resisting the state 
brings him joy, though he still does not approve of Jill as a terrorist. 
He believes a Christmas package she is carrying is a bomb. When Jill 
proposes that Sam open the package to confirm its innocuous 
contents, Sam refuses. He feigns trust. Throughout the film, there is 
a repression of terrorism. A bomb goes off while Sam and his mother 
are having lunch, and no one pays attention to the burned and 
mutilated bodies, except some of the restaurant workers. A band 
continues to play in the restaurant, and the waiters put up a partition 
so that the customers do not make an effort to look. Maurice Blanchot 
writes about this attitude toward disaster in UEcriture du desastre: “The 
disaster ruins everything, all the while leaving everything intact. It 
does not touch anyone in particular.”37 The repetition of terrorism 
devalues its impact. In fact, in the world of Brazil, terrorism appears to 
be a “normal” part of life. The traumatic effects of the bombings are 
absorbed in order to be forgotten. Blanchot says that the disaster is 
related to forgetfulness. Forgetfulness and withdrawal mark the 
postmodern scene, at least as it appears in Brazil.
I ll
The victory of the state over the people as portrayed in Brazil 
contradicts the film’s references to Eisenstein’s work, particularly to 
October and Battleship Potemkin. Before addressing the political differ­
ences between Gilliam’s film and Eisenstein’s work, I should note the 
references to Eisenstein’s work in Brazil. For example, one of Gilliam’s 
quotations of Eisenstein involves a mask worn by Jack Lint, a character 
who tortures people for the state. {Brazil tells us that one’s worst 
enemy is one’s friend.) The mask, or one very much like it, can be 
found in the “masks of the gods” montage in October (1928). Also, 
toward the end of Brazil, when Sam Lowry imagines he is part of 
Archibald Tuttle’s revolutionary forces, Gilliam presents a repeat of 
Eisenstein’s Odessa steps sequence from Battleship Potemkin (1925).38
Generally speaking, Eisenstein’s films present the viewer with
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images of mass action. Political changes come about through social 
movement, like the storming of the Winter Palace depicted in October. 
In Eisenstein’s films, the state does not crush the people, nor force 
them to retreat into their imaginations, as if imagination were the only 
place left for freedom.
In Brazil, one can find little hope for political change, either in the 
diegetic space, or in the space of our own society. One of the few 
hopes lies in Archibald Tuttle, who is apparently still loose in the 
world of the film, acting as a kind of Robin Hood, or as an outlaw 
mechanic. Tuttle understands how things fit together. For example, 
the labyrinthine structure of ubiquitous pipes and hoses frustrates 
Sam but not Tuttle. For Sam, the “system,” if only of pipes and hoses, 
is out of control, and his attempts at understanding are repeatedly 
frustrated.
This sort of frustration also characterizes postmodern politics and 
art, which is one reason I think Brazil serves as an example of 
postmodernism in its non-architectural context. Not to understand is 
one of the goals of postmodernism. Postmodernists celebrate incoher­
ence, the uninterpretable. In many ways, Brazil resists interpretation. 
In Brazil, one can detect anagrams, allusions to other films, allegorical 
elements, but ultimately one is at great pains to piece the puzzle 
together, partly because the pieces come from many different puzzles, 
or, to use another image, the viewer cannot find the key to unlock, say, 
the end of the film, which takes place in a vast domed structure 
shaped much like a keyhole, a shape that appears as an important 
clue.
Brazil could be seen as an example of an anti-hermeneutical work, 
but here I would stress that to call something uninterpretable is still to 
understand the work in some way. The Heideggerian “as-structure” 
of understanding is still at work, for the viewer can see Brazil as a 
postmodern work. Something completely alien, completely beyond 
comprehension would be terrifying. We would be in the realm of the 
Unspeakable.
While many postmodernists have been moving away from dialogue 
and toward the Unspeakable, Juergen Habermas has been writing in 
favor of a return to social solidarity and integration, and a repudiation 
of an anti-hermeneutics campaign. For Habermas, to produce works 
which are unreadable encourages disjointedness and confusion. Ha­
bermas contends that social unity can be achieved with communicative 
argumentation which supplants more authoritarian and coercive 
forms of social coordination—he is supporting a return to rhetoric.39
A proponent of postmodernism, Jean-Francois Lyotard sets out to 
refute Habermas, and proposes smashing any idea that supports unity
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of experience. For postmodernists, it is naive to have confidence in the 
notion of emancipation through social action (Eisenstein). Postmo­
dernists endorse the death of the social, and prefer neutrality to taking 
sides in social causes, because successful resistance merely substitutes 
one form of power and oppression for another. Nevertheless, at the 
the end of the essay, “What Is Postmodernism?” Lyotard uses milita­
ristic language in his diatribe against coherence: “Let us wage war on 
totality,” he writes. “Let us be witnesses to the unpresentable; let us 
activate the differences and save the honor of the name.”40 As Felix 
Guattari sees it, “According to Lyotard we must still be extemely 
suspicious of the least desire for any serious social action. All values 
that achieve a consensus, he says, have become old fashioned and 
questionable.”41 Guatttari refuses to nod to Lyotard’s call to war, as do 
I.
Lyotard would like Brazil, for “Brazil makes you feel that no rational 
understanding of the world is possible—that all we have is what T.S. 
Eliot called ‘a heap of broken images.’ ”42 In this respect, Brazil is a 
rocaille shellwork, made from broken images or shells put together like 
a mosaic, a mosaic filled with bits of information. This point would 
probably please Lyotard, since at the end of The Postmodern Condition, 
he urges the opening of data banks to the public in the belief that 
“Language games would then be games of perfect information at any 
given moment.”43 Lyotard’s suggestion emerges, in part, from the 
postmodern paranoia concerning totalizing effects, and exhausting 
texts—as if such a thing were possible. Gadamer has shown that 
understanding always requires an endless back-and-forth of a many- 
sided dialogue. For Gadamer, understanding is never finished, be­
cause, as creatures in history, we are always understanding differently.
Also, Lyotard confuses the relationship between information and 
understanding. Give someone who reads only English 50 encyclope­
dias written in Arabic, and you have increased that person’s access to 
information, but understanding has not improved at all. In “What is 
Practice?: The Conditions of Social Reason,” Gadamer puts the matter 
this way:
The increase in the degree of information, then, does not necessarily mean a 
strengthening of social reason. Instead, it seems to me that the real problem lies 
right here: the threatening loss of identity by people today. The individual in 
society who feels dependent and helpless in the face of its technically mediated life 
forms becomes incapable of establishing an identity.44
Searches for identity and attempts at abolishing identity propel Brazil, 
e.g. the Buttle/Tuttle confusion, and Sam’s attempt to “delete” Jill 
Layton from society. Given the immense bureaucratic structures 
cemented in place in Brazil, people are reduced to functionaries, mere 
operators of machines. The state and the state’s technology subordi­
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nate identity to themselves; human beings can identify themselves 
only in relation to their positions in institutions or in relation to their 
attachments to technological devices. It is no coincidence that the 
acronym for the Ministry of Information is MOI. A decade before 
Brazil, Gadamer described the situation Terry Gilliam put on film, a 
world in which, as Gadamer says, “ever fewer people are making the 
decisions and ever more are manning the apparatus.”45
The bottom line here is, of course, capital, not art, nor postmodern­
ism, though all three are connected. Scheinberg’s attempt to make 
Brazil a happy film for “the all-important teenage category” under­
scores the political message Hollywood sends out, a postmodern 
message that endorses floating along in a state of undercommitted­
ness (to use Rapaport’s language), but committed to happy endings 
and to the belief that freedom of the imagination is sufficient in a 
repressive state (recall Gilliam’s claim that Sam is a hero). From the 
side of hermeneutics, the point is to see Brazil differently—as a film 
that speaks to present circumstances, circumstances in which effective 
political dedication is missing, and in which such dedication needs to 
be renewed.46
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